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I. Introduction
Canada has undergone a dramatic economic change over the past two decades.
From reluctance to expand trade and dependence upon the United States for a majority
of trade to free trade with the United States and Mexico, Canada has made a move
to become a dominant economic player in the Western Hemisphere and the world.
Canada used tariff-free trade to increase trade with its current trading partners, to find
new trading partners, and to open up a multitude of opportunities around the world.
Trade agreements such as NAFTA opened those doors. The next step in this evolution is
increased free trade expansion. Several options exist for Canada in its pursuit. The most
talked about and controversial trade agreement is the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
a free trade zone that would stretch from the northern reaches of Canada and Alaska
to the southern tip of Argentina. Other possibilities for free trade expansion include an
expansion of NAFTA, coupling between NAFTA and its South American counterparts,
J.D. 2000, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. This article is an adaptation
from a comment presented by Mr. Goldstein as a member of the International Law Review
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184 Law and Business Review of the Americas
and bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. This article will examine this evolution
of the Canadian economy through its trade with Western Hemisphere neighbors and,
more importantly, where trade pacts may take the Canadian economy in the future. Part
2 of this article examines Canada's past economic pursuits. Part 3 examines the current
status of Canada's economy. Part 4 looks at Canada's free trade options for the future.
II. Canada's Economic Past: Events Leading up to NAFTA
Prior to the creation of any free trade agreements, Canadian policy on trade was
to protect itself from becoming too dependent on the United States.' The United States
was-and still is-Canada's main trading partner.2 American products, however, were
viewed as superior, making competition in the U.S. market all the more difficult for
Canadian products. 3 Canadian industry could not compete with American industry, in
both quality and production levels, and the overall fear was that, if allowed to freely trade
with and invest in Canadian industry, the United States would gain too much control
and exact excessive power over Canada's economy.4 In effect, Canada feared losing its
own identity, both economically and culturally.5 Canada's foreign policy is based upon
the "three pillars of national prosperity, national security, and the projection abroad of
our values and culture."6 Canada has a strong sense of national identity and Canadians
feared that too much control by the United States would result in the destruction of that
identity.7
These fears led the Canadian government during the 1960s and 1970s to experiment
with numerous trade and industry policies, including high import tariffs, subsidies for
industrial modernization and new product development, regulation of foreign-controlled
enterprises, and limitations on foreign ownership in key sectors such as oil and gas.'
1. See Peter Morici, Assessing the Canada- US Free Trade Agreement, 26 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 491
(1996). From the 1940s through 1960, the Canadian economy had been powered by the rapid
development of mineral resources and other natural resource exports to the United States.
Id. After 1960, the combined contribution of mineral, petroleum, farm, forest, and fishery
products to Canadian exports to the United States declined significantly, and the attention
of policy-makers increasingly turned to Canada's manufacturing. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. The United States also relied upon contingent protection in the form of supplemental
duties imposed upon Canadian products on a case-by-case basis when U.S. products were
believed to be injured by their Canadian counterparts. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Osvaldo Nunez, Quebec's Perspective on Social Aspects and the Broadening of Free
Trade in the Americas, 11 CONN. J. INT'L L. 279 (1996). Polls taken in Canada in the 1980s
suggested that a referendum on Canadian involvement in a free trade agreement with the
United States would have been defeated. Id. at 280.
6. David Kilgour, Speech to the Diplomatic Press Attache Network (Oct. 15, 1997), in CANADIAN
SPEECHES, Dec. 1997, at 19-23. Kilgour is the Canadian Secretary of State for Latin America
and Africa.
7. See generally id. Kilgour's speech described how the United States is Canada's best interna-
tional friend and how the two countries share many values. But when Canada has something
different to say, the country must speak up. Id.
8. See Morici, supra note 1.
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The tariffs and other measures were designed to protect Canadian products from outside
competition, primarily from U.S. products, and improve the competitiveness of Canadian
manufacturing.9 Foreign nations would be forced to pay so much extra to sell their
products in Canada, they would essentially be dissuaded from exporting to Canada at
all.' This would in turn give Canadian products a distinct advantage. Unfortunately,
these measures did little to help. While protecting the interests of Canadian businesses
within Canada, the tariffs did little to improve exportation, and without any infusion of
capital and technology from foreign sources, production levels remained at levels inferior
to Canada's competitors. As of 1980, 64 percent of Canadian exports went to the United
States, and Canadian manufacturing productivity was estimated at 77 percent of United
States levels.'"
In response to this failure, the Canadian government reversed its field and recognized
that tariffs would not sufficiently protect Canadian industry from U.S. competition.'
2
A better approach would be to negotiate a free trade agreement with the United States
to eliminate tariffs and other non-tariff barriers. 3 Canadian economists concluded that
such action was in Canada's best interests. 4 The Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada stated:
Canada's economic growth is critically dependent on secure access to foreign mar-
kets. Our most important market is the United States, which now takes up to three-
quarters of our exports. More, better, and more secure access to the United States
market represents a basic requirement, while denial of that access is an ever-present
hazard.'"
Proponents of free trade believed it would encourage new investment in Canadian indus-
try and allow Canadian industry to penetrate American markets and achieve efficiencies
and economies of scale with the United States." Eliminating trade barriers would not
only increase trading but also allow an infusion of foreign investment to spur growth in
Canadian industry. 7
Despite the Canadian government's belief that free trade was the proper direction in
which to turn, public opinion did not concur. A poll taken in 1986 suggested that Cana-
dians did not support the Conservative government proposing free trade. 8 The public
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id; see also STATISTICS CANADA, CANADIAN ECONOMIC OBSERVER: HISTORICAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT (Ottawa, 1995) 52.
12. See Morici, supra note 1.
13. Id.
14. See Nunez, supra note 5, at 280.
15. Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations 10 (1985) (quoted in Nunez, supra note 5,
at 280).
16. See Morici, supra note 1.
17. Id.
18. See Nunez, supra note 5, at 280 (discussing how Quebec was the only Canadian province to
support a free trade agreement with the United States, and Quebec's overwhelming support
of free trade was the key factor in making free trade a reality).
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still clung to the idea of strong protection through tariffs and other protective barriers.
Without these barriers, some Canadians believed the United States would overwhelm
Canada's industries. 9 "It was with considerable discomfort that Canada resigned itself
to negotiating a free trade agreement with its powerful American neighbor."2
The Canadian government forged ahead with its plans to expand trade. In order to
both achieve its goals and soothe the fears of opponents, the Canadian government set
out to achieve the following four goals in a free trade agreement:
(1) Enhance access to the U.S. market by eliminating tariffs and most remaining
U.S. non-tariff barriers;
(2) Secure this access by limiting the application of U.S. contingent protection to
Canadian exports;
(3) Create a strong agreement to protect this access with an effective dispute settle-
ment mechanism; and
(4) Maintain Canadian discretion in sensitive cultural industries and other aspects
of domestic and international policy.2'
The end result was the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). 22 The FTA established
preferential trade status between Canada and the United States, eliminating tariffs on
goods and promoting foreign investment opportunities for both countries. 23 Canada
was able to remove trade barriers while still protecting its economy and culture from
excessive American influence.
The reduction in trade barriers led to an increase in Canadian market shares in the
United States. For example, from 1988 to 1994, U.S. imports from Canada grew much
more rapidly than imports from other countries, 58.4 percent to 47.9 percent, respec-
tively.24 This was in stark contrast to the previous decade, where the import growth
comparatively was 113.9 percent to 112.1 percent. 25 Studies show that Canadian exports
grew most rapidly in areas where tariffs and other barriers were cut the most.26 Non-
resource product exports such as office and telecommunications equipment, precision
instruments, and other equipment and tools increased by 48.9 percent from 1988 to
1992.27 In the same time frame, resource-based product exports such as paper and chem-
icals increased 24.8 percent. 2 One sector that has seen major advances is energy. Once
19. See Morici, supra note 1. Canadian nationalists argued that elimination of protection through
tariffs would force Canada to rely more on natural-resource products. And the economic
integration achieved through a free trade agreement would lead to the United States over-
whelming Canadian industry culturally and politically. Id.
20. Nunez, supra note 5, at 280.
21. PETER MORICI, A NEW SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: FREE TRADE AND UNITED STATES CANADA
ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE 1990s 64-65 (1991).
22. Jan. 1, 1989, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter FTA].
23. See Morici, supra note 1.
24. See GREG MASTEL & ANDREW SZAMOSSZEGI, THE U.S.-CANADA FTA: A GOOD DEAL, A GOOD
MODEL 8 (Economic Strategy Institute 1995); see also Morici, supra note 1.
25. See Morici, supra note 1.
26. Id.
27. Id (quoting DANIEL SCHWANEN, A GROWING SUCCESS: CANADA'S PERFORMANCE UNDER FREE
TRADE, Commentary No. 52, 7 (Toronto, C.D. Howe Institute, 1993)).
28. Id.
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bogged down by regulations and policies that prevented cooperation and trade, Canada
is now the United States' second largest oil supplier.29
The FTA helped to prepare Canada to compete in sectors with significant growth
opportunities for advanced industrial countries by pushing Canada toward specialized
manufacturing and service activities.30 Industries that exhibited strong advances include
insurance, financial services, consulting, advertising, and communications.3 ' Advances in
these industries provided Canada with the opportunity to increase trade and investment
globally.
Overall, trade between Canada and the United States has doubled in the past ten
years.3 2 One billion dollars in trade crosses the Canada-United States border every day,
and some economists believe the two countries have barely scratched the surface on
potential trade and investment between them.3 3 However, the FTA did much more than
create free trade between Canada and the United States. In addition to tariff-free trade,
the FTA included rules governing the regulation of investment, services, government
procurement, and product standards.34 In effect, the FTA created the most sweeping free
trade arrangement since the creation of the European Community in the 1950s.
31
Perhaps an overlooked effect of the FTA is the positive effect the FTA had on the
Canadian people. The success of free trade within the Canadian economy served to wipe
away much of the fears that existed prior to the FTA's creation. 36 Seeing such success
29. Peter F. Romero, The U.S.-Canada Relationship and the Western Hemisphere, Remarks at the
Meeting of the Canadian-American Business Council (Oct. 7, 1998), in DEP'T ST. Disp., Nov.
1998, at 22. Another area that has been affected by the FTA is the auto industry. The two-
way trade that crosses the Ambassador Bridge between Michigan and Ontario equals all U.S.
exports to Japan, most of which is auto related. Autos and auto parts account for about
one-third of bilateral trade. Id.
30. See Morici, supra note 1.
31. id.
32. See Romero, supra note 29. While trade numbers improved, improvement in Canadian pro-
ductivity versus the United States has not been as substantial. From 1988 to 1995, output-per-
hour manufacturing in Canada increased 14 percent compared with 19 percent in the United
States. Overall, Canadian manufacturing productivity fell to roughly 68 percent of U.S. levels.
While free trade was supposed to correct this problem, it is believed that inflation prevented
any improvement. The Bank of Canada maintained a highly restrictive monetary policy to
reduce inflation, which prevented Canadian GDP and investment growth from moving at
the same levels as in the United States. From 1988 to 1993, GDP and investment grew 5.7
and 4.1 percent, respectively, in Canada compared with 6.5 and 4.9 percent in the United
States. With inflation now under control in Canada, production levels should match that of
the United States. See Morici, supra note 1.
33. See Romero, supra note 29. As of 1998, exports to the United States accounted for one-fourth
of Canada's gross domestic product. Id.
34. See Morici, supra note 1. One example of programs growing out of the FTA is the U.S.-
Canada Shared Border Accord, designed to make the customs and immigration processes
more efficient. This would in turn facilitate and speed up trade between the two countries.
See MoRIcI, supra note 21.
35. See Morici, supra note 1.
36. See Canadian Culture Moving to Center Stage in Global Marketplace, Reports TIME Canada
in Special Issue, CANADA NEwsWIRE, Aug. 3, 1999, at http://www.newswire.ca/releases/
august 1 999/03/c0206.html.
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in the economy, such as the extensive growth in exports, instilled in Canadians a belief
that tariff-free trade can work without robbing them of their identity and convinced
them that more of the same would be beneficial.37 A recent survey conducted by TIME
Canada revealed that 51 percent of Canadians believe their culture should be more open
to outside influences versus only 36 percent who believe the opposite.38 One of the stated
objectives of the FTA was to "lay the foundations for further bilateral and multilateral
cooperation."39 Given the success of the FTA, Canada was ready, willing, and able to
move on to greater trade agreements.
III. Present: NAFTA and Other Trading Opportunities: Canada
Begins to Move Further South
A. NAFTA
Building upon the success of the FTA, the next step for Canada was to expand the
free trade idea to include more countries besides the United States. The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 40 an agreement between Canada, the United States, and
Mexico was the result. The most important aspect from Canada's point of view was
the inclusion of Mexico in a tariff-free trade agreement. While the FTA was successful
in creating increases in exports and identifying sectors of industry in which Canada
could excel, Canada remained dependent upon the United States for a majority of its
trade. The addition of Mexico as a free trade partner meant an opportunity to develop
trade with another nation and perhaps reduce Canada's reliance on the United States.
In furtherance of these ideas, the stated goals of NAFTA were to eliminate tariff and
non-tariff trade barriers, increase economic growth and jobs in Mexico, Canada and the
United States, provide preferential treatment for each other's products, and increase a
joint ability to compete against both a unified European Community and an increasingly
dynamic Asia.4'
NAFTA created the first continent-wide free trade area, uniting nearly 370 million
people and a combined production of more than six trillion dollars.42 On its base level,
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. FTA, supra note 22, at 293.
40. Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
41. Id. art. 102 & pmbl. Like the FTA, NAFTA covered much more than the elimination of trade
barriers; NAFTA also included agreements on labor standards, transportation, investment,
and communications to name a few. See Betty Southard Murphy, Book Review, NAFTA: What
Comes Next?, 16 J. INT'L L. Bus. 318, 319 (1995) [hereinafter Book Review].
42. See Hearings Before the Employment, Housing and Aviation Subcommittee of the Committee
on Government Operations, 93, 146-47 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings]; see also Betty Southard
Murphy, Symposium: NAFTA at Age One: A Blueprint for Hemispheric Integration?: II. The
Labor Side Agreement: NAFTA's North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: The Present
and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403 (1995) [hereinafter Labor Cooperation]; see also Book
Review, supra note 41; see also Barbara Rudolph, The North American Free Trade Agreement:
A $6 Trillion Market Gamble for 363 Million Consumers, TIME, Aug. 10, 1992, at 43.
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NAFTA called for the rollback of up to twenty thousand tariffs over fifteen years. 43 Prior
to NAFTA, tariff levels on imports averaged approximately 4 percent in the United States,
5 percent in Canada, and 11 percent in Mexico." In some cases, tariffs were much higher.
For example, cocoa imports into Mexico had a 20 percent duty placed on them; tequila
entering Canada had a 183 percent duty.4" After NAFTA's inception, these tariffs would
eventually disappear.
A good example of the effect of the reduction in tariffs can be seen in the grain
industry. Because Mexico produces little grain of its own, it relies heavily on grain
imports.46 Canada and the United States are the world leaders in grain exports.4 7 Under
NAFTA, both countries received preferential treatment in exporting to Mexico.48 The
tariff on wheat from Canada and the United States was set at 15 percent to be gradu-
ally reduced to zero.49 The tariff on wheat from other suppliers was set at 67 percent.
50
Canada and the United States were given a huge advantage over the rest of the world's
grain suppliers. The additional expense of the high tariff effectively shut out the compe-
tition, 51 leaving only Canada to compete with the United States.5"
The overall effect of tariff-free trade on Canada, much like when the FTA was
created, was enormous. From 1992 to 1997, Canadian exports grew three and a half
times faster than the gross domestic product (GDP).5 3 The percentage of GDP from
exports grew from 27 percent ten years ago to 44 percent. 54 These numbers mean that
Canadian exports not only increased in comparison to imports, but also took on a
greater importance in the Canadian economy.55 Canada was no longer relying on itself
43. See Rudolph, supra note 42.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Kenneth Murray & James Gartner, Opening Doors in a Burgeoning Regional Grain
Market, AGExPORTER, Jan. 1, 1999, at 27, at http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/agexporter/1999/
opening.html. Grain exports from the United States and Canada to Mexico are expected to
continue growing. Mexico's demand for grain is far greater than its production capacity, and







52. In addition to the increased export of grain to Mexico, Canada has also made inroads on
exports to the United States. In 1997, Canada exported $1.7 billion in wheat, malting barley,
oats, and processed products like pet food, cereal, and bread. The United States only exported
$1.1 billion in grain products, mostly corn and processed items, to Canada the same year. This
has been cause for alarm among U.S. farmers; however, U.S. processors especially welcome
Canadian oats. U.S. oat-production levels have declined, now meeting just two-thirds of
domestic consumption needs. Id.
53. See Department of Foreign Affairs-An Evolving NAFTA-by the Honourable Sergio Marchi,
Minister of International Trade, CANADIAN CORP. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 19, 1999 [hereinafter For-
eign Affairs].
54. See Andrew Purvis, New Force in the Hemisphere, TIME, June 28, 1999, at 28.
55. See generally Foreign Affairs, supra note 53. Marchi states that NAFTA has made Canada more
innovative and competitive and that most Canadians have come to embrace free trade. Id.
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for consumption of its products. The United States and now Mexico provided greater
outlets for Canadian products. From 1993 to 1997, Canada's trade with the United States
increased 50 percent and over 80 percent with Mexico.56
In addition to the increased trade, Canadian direct investment is up 75 percent in the
past decade5 7 and nearly 70 percent of the $187.6 billion in foreign direct investment in
Canada comes from the United States and Mexico." What did this mean for Canada? For
one, over one and a half million jobs were created.5 9 Moreover, technology and capital
made their way into Canada to improve production and manufacturing techniques.6 °
Similar to the FTA, NAFTA differed from other trade agreements that preceded it.
NAFTA was intended to encompass a variety of economic relations besides trade, such as
investment, communications, and environmental and labor matters.61 In essence, NAFTA
created a unified economic force that would allow each of the countries to compete
better globally.62 This effect was much more important to Canada and Mexico than to
the United States, given that the United States was already a superpower. An alliance
with the United States on an economic level gave Canada and Mexico an opportunity to
access the expanding markets of Central and South America. 63
B. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH CHILE
Building upon NAFTAs success, especially with regard to the success of free trade
with Mexico, Canada shifted its focus toward Latin America in looking for new trade
partners. In its first-ever bilateral trade agreement with a South American country,
Canada signed a free trade agreement with Chile in 1996.64 Similar to the FTA and
NAFTA, this agreement eliminated tariffs on trade between the two countries. 6 Nearly
56. See Romero, supra note 29.
57. See Purvis, supra note 54.
58. See Foreign Affairs, supra note 53.
59. Id.
60. See generally id.
61. See SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, NAFTA: WHAT COMES NEXT? 2 (1994). The United States felt the
labor agreement reached in NAFTA was not strong enough and conditioned its passage of
NAFTA upon labor side agreements becoming a part of NAFTA. See Labor Cooperation, supra
note 42, at 404.
62. See Book Review, supra note 41, at 318-19.
63. See Labor Cooperation, supra note 42, at 404.
64. See John Geddes, Chile Free Trade Pact Finalized: Deal Eliminates Tariffs on 80% of Canadian
Exports, FIN. PosT, Nov. 15, 1996, at 4. Chile has been one of the more aggressive Latin
American countries in pursuing trade agreements. In addition to Canada, Chile has made
deals with Mexico and several other Latin American and Caribbean countries, including the
MERCOSUR trade bloc of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. When Chile made the
free trade agreement with Canada, its largest trading partners were the United States, Japan,
Great Britain, Korea, and Brazil. See Peter Morton, Lukewarm on Latin America: The Latin
American Countries Are Willing to Talk about a Broad, Hemispheric Free Trade Pact, but if
Canada's Existing Agreement with Chile Is Any Barometer, Many of Our Companies Aren't All
That Interested, FIN. POST, Apr. 18, 1999, at 18. As Purvis stated, "Chile has become a poster
child for free trade." Purvis, supra note 54.
65. See Geddes, supra note 64.
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80 percent of Canadian exports to Chile became tariff-free.66 Trade between the two
countries amounts to roughly $600 million per year, and Canada is now Chile's second
largest foreign investor at seven billion dollars.
67
The most important aspect of this trade agreement was that it did not involve the
United States. As opposed to previous agreements, Canada formed an advantage over the
United States.6" While American products enter Chile with a 10 percent duty attached
to them, similar Canadian products enter duty-free. 69 Clearly, Canadian products can be
exported to Chile much easier and at a lower price than their American counterparts.
An example of how this difference plays out can be seen from consumer-oriented
food sales in Chile.7" This is an area in which the United States excels with high qual-
ity products, especially in the areas of fast food and processed foods for supermar-
kets.71 Canada's processed foods and beverages enter Chile tariff-free, making them much
more desirable from a cost standpoint, if not from a quality standpoint, than United
States products.72 For items such as frozen potatoes, U.S. market share in Chile has
declined.73 With over ninety Canadian companies operating in Chile, that trend is likely
to continue. 4
C. TEAM CANADA: TRADE MISSION TO LATIN AMERICA
Recognizing that Latin America provided fertile ground for Canada to expand trade
and decrease dependency upon trade with the United States, the Canadian government
surged ahead with more ideas. The most prominent of those ideas was Team Canada. 71 In
66. Id. Most manufactured goods were duty-free and duties on agriculture were reduced 45
percent, both from the deal's inception. The remaining tariffs were to be reduced over a
five-year period. Id.
67. Id. In comparison, trade between the United States and Chile amounted to more than seven
billion dollars. See Morton, supra note 64.
68. The United States maintains a large presence in Latin America, but suspicion of U.S. motive
exists in the region. By contrast, Canadian products are well accepted and the image of
Canada is strong. Id.
69. See Richard Blabey, Demand's Up for Consumer Foods in Chile, AGExPORTER, Apr. 1, 1999, at
13, at http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/agexporter/1999/demands.html.
70. Id.
71. Id. Consumption of prepared foods in Chile doubled in 1996. Convenience foods like frozen
dinners and pizzas averaged $500,000 per month in sales in 1997 for each of the five local
leading food companies and was expected to grow to two million dollars per month in 1999.
In addition, 70 percent of Chileans eat one to two meals out every day. Id.
72. See generally id.
73. Id.
74. See Morton, supra note 64. One example of the Canadian advantage can be seen in the
telecommunications industry. Northern Telecom beat out its U.S. rivals like AT&T for a $200
million contract. The key factor was the 11 percent tariff that no longer applies to Canadian
companies, thereby allowing them to undercut the competition. Id.
75. See, e.g., Planning Ahead with Team Canada: International Trade Minister Sergio Marchi Dis-
cusses the Success in Latin America and Where the Mission May Go Next, PLANT, Apr. 20, 1998,
at 25 [hereinafter Planning Ahead]; Neville Nankivell, Team Canada Trade Approach Proves
Its Worth in Opening Markets for Us: Early Reports Suggest Latin America Mission Will Largely
Meet Its Aim of Strengthening Ties with the Region, FIN. POST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 23.
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an effort to strengthen ties with Latin America, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien
and Trade Minister Sergio Marchi led a group of Canadian business people in January
1998, on a four-country tour to help facilitate contracts, joint ventures, and partnerships
with Latin American counterparts.7 6 The venture was a huge success. Team Canada
visited Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, netting $1.8 billion in contracts for Canadian
companies.77 Ninety-one deals were signed in Mexico alone, valued at $230 million.78
In addition to setting up deals, the mission was a way for Canadian business people
to get to know their Latin American counterparts. Marchi said that the business people
"came away from the mission feeling there is something very special between Canada and
Latin America' 79 That something special may be a common need to lessen dependence
upon the United States as a trading partner; trade between Canada and Latin American
countries may be seen as an opportunity to achieve that goal."0
IV. Future: Canada Looks to Move Forward
with Increased Free Trade
In the past decade, Canada has made great strides in their efforts to expand trade.
Trade with Latin America has doubled to ten billion dollars, and Canadian direct invest-
ment in the region has quadrupled in the past five years to eighteen billion dollars.8'
Canadian companies are ever increasing their reach into the region. Seventy-five Cana-
dian companies are operating in Peru, with 200 others represented through local agents.8 2
Bell Canada International recently won the rights to provide local telephone service in
Brazil. 3 Canada has been described as "brimming with self-confidence, assertively inter-
nationalist, free from the discontents of the recent past, and with a powerful streak of
moralism."8 4
So, what comes next? It would seem that Canada has done nearly everything that
is possible to improve its economic situation. The change from 1980 to the present has
been remarkable. However, many believe more change is necessary.8 5 In a discussion for
76. See Planning Ahead, supra note 75. Other objectives of the mission were to bring the Canadian
government closer to the governments of the four countries visited and to discuss potential
future free trade agreements. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Nankivell, supra note 75. To follow up on the deals and ensure they come to fruition, the
Canadian government planned to put six trade commissioners in the region. See Planning
Ahead, supra note 75.
79. Planning Ahead, supra note 75. The Latin Americans expressed interest in Canada as a whole,
inquiring about Canadian social and governmental programs and how Canada relates to the
United States. Id.
80. See generally id.
81. See Purvis, supra note 54.
82. Id.
83. id.
84. Richard Gwyn, Address at the Canadian Institute of International Affairs Foreign Policy
Conference (1998), quoted in Gerald Wright, Independent Partners: Canada, the USA and the
World, BEHIND THE HEADLINES, Mar. 1999, at 10.
85. In a poll conducted by TIME Magazine, 55 percent of Canadians polled believe industries
in Canada need to be more open to the world economy versus 31 percent who felt industry
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a TIME Canada special report, a group of economists concluded that "Canada must
take significant and immediate steps to become more competitive internationally, or risk
a declining standard of living as other nations better prepared to embrace the change
move ahead in the global economy of the future." 6 The United States is still Canada's
dominant trade partner, and Canada continues to search for new trade partners.
Based upon the past successes in Latin America, Canada is focusing its search for
free trade expansion there. 7 The financial crisis in Asia and Europe's focus on its own
economic union are additional factors. But concerns with trade expansion into Latin
America do exist. As a whole, the Latin American nations' economic and political devel-
opment lags behind that of Canada and the United States. 8
Corruption, torture, rampant crime, and discrimination toward indigenous groups
continue to plague the region. 9 Human rights considerations in regard to labor practices
are also a problem.9" Labor standards in Latin America are far below that in Canada,
with people working for pennies without a union to protect them.9" The Canadian
government has been pressed by activist groups to address these concerns prior to making
any future trade agreements in Latin America.9
2
Despite these concerns, Canadian business people and trade officials see Latin Amer-
ica as a huge potential market for Canadian industries, such as mining, forestry, fish-
eries, agri-food and technology.93 Current exports to Latin America are on a constant
upward swing.94 Canadian presence in Latin America is already rather extensive and is
still growing.
95
should be more protected. See Deadline 2005: Prominent Canadian Economists Raise Serious
Concerns about Canada's Global Competitiveness, CANADA NEwsWIRE, June 21, 1999.
86. Id. The economists suggested that critical factors in Canada's future are strong leadership
and opening more of the economy to private ownership, especially in sectors like health and
education where there is little international competition. Id.
87. See Jennifer Ditchburn, Chretien to Talk Trade, Human Rights in Mexico, CANADIAN PRESS
NEWSWIRE, Apr. 7, 1999; see also Purvis, supra note 54; Nankivell, supra note 75.
88. See Ditchburn, supra note 87.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Unions in Canada and the United States have complained since the inception of NAFTA of
the poor labor standards in Mexico, fearing that companies would take advantage and move
their operations. NAFTA failed to specifically address the issue of labor standards. Id.
92. Id.
93. Wilson Ruiz, Dancing to a Latin Beat: Canada Has High Free-Trade Hopes, MACLEAN'S, Apr.
20, 1998, at 22 (quotes Gilles Theriault, Chairman, UNIC Marketing Group and Member,
Team Canada mission in 1998). According to Claude Carriere, Canada's top FTAA negotiator,
the most promising opportunities for Canada lie in modernizing newly privatized and often
badly out-of-date telecommunications, energy and transportation infrastructure. See Purvis,
supra note 54.
94. For example, Kalish Canada, Inc., a manufacturer of packaging machinery, reported annual
sales to Brazil quadrupled in 1997 to $2.2 million and expected another 30 percent increase
in 1998. See Ruiz, supra note 93.
95. For instance, Quebec has maintained special ties with Latin America for a long time, by way
of permanent Quebec delegations in Mexico City, Mexico; Bogota, Colombia; and Caracas,
Venezuela. See Nunez, supra note 5, at 282.
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Canadian companies have been active in Brazil since the mid-nineteenth century,
when Canadian and British-owned Brazilian Light and Traction Co. obtained a lease to
provide electricity to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo." Alcan Aluminum, Brazil's largest
foil and beverage-can producer had revenues of $369 million in 1998 and employed
2,500 people.97 Nortel Networks expects to spend billions of dollars in the next few years
on a communications infrastructure in Latin America.98
Beyond the numbers, Canada views Latin America as an opportunity to take advan-
tage of failures by the United States. "The great benefit for Canada of getting involved
in Latin America is that it gets us out of the U.S.'s backyard."99 In addition, Canadians
have no history of political interference in the internal affairs of other countries in the
hemisphere, unlike the United States.' Latin Americans, in turn, are beginning to take
interest in connecting with a medium-sized nation like Canada.' A certain amount of
cultural affinity exists between Canada and Latin America.' 2
Latin America also has a long history of attempts to implement a large free trade
region, dating as far back as the nineteenth century.'03 The most significant effort was
the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), formed in 1960."o LAFTA was
designed to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between the Latin Amer-
ican member nations.' Unfortunately, LAFTA failed to achieve its goals and disbanded
in 1980.106 LAFTA, however, did give rise to the creation of smaller regional trade groups
96. See Purvis, supra note 54.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quotes Nortel regional president Daniel Hunt).
99. Canada Ready to Take Centre Stage in Hemisphere, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 22, 1998 [hereinafter
Canada Ready].
100. Canada refused to join the U.S.-led economic embargo of Cuba and in 1998 reached a
cooperation agreement with the Castro government, which is credited with aiding the release
of twelve Cuban political prisoners who emigrated to Canada in 1998. See Ruiz, supra note
93. Latin America hopes that Canada will push for the inclusion of Cuba in a free trade
agreement. Id.
101. Id. One Peruvian news reporter has asked, "Why isn't Canada more present in Latin America?
How can we get Canadians to care about us?" Id.
102. The cultural affinity comes from a common sense of playing second fiddle to the United
States, as an economic power in both the Western Hemisphere and the world. See, e.g.,
Purvis, supra note 54. In addition, "Quebec's French-speaking and 'Latin' character may have
something to do with its people's openness toward continued expansion of free trade zone
to include the rest of Latin America." Nunez, supra note 5, at 282.
103. Latin American integration dates back to the attempts of Simon Bolivar beginning in 1815.
See Lisa Anderson, Comment; The Future of Hemispheric Free Trade: Towards a Unified Hemi-
sphere?, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L. 635, 640 (1998).
104. See Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., Hemispheric Integration and the Elimination of Legal Obstacles Under
a NAFTA-Based System, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 127, 130 (1995). The seven charter members
were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. Colombia and Ecuador
joined in 1961, Venezuela in 1966, and Bolivia in 1967. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. LAFTA implementation fell behind schedule after four years and never recovered, primar-
ily due to the vastly differing economic policies and development levels among the member
nations. See DONALD W. BAERRESEN ET AL., LATIN AMERICAN TRADE PATTERNS 35-36 (1965).
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in the 1980s and 1990s."°7 The member nations are now actively pursuing expanded free
trade, both individually and through the trade groups.
°8
All the signs point to the creation of more free trade agreements between Canada
and Latin America. The question is: how can this be accomplished?
A. FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS
The biggest and most ambitious free trade idea was put in motion five years ago.' °9
The Team Canada mission sought to accomplish a second goal: to get more movement
for the concept of establishing a free trade area throughout the Americas. 1 ° This idea
first came to light at the 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida."' Leaders of
thirty-four Western Hemisphere nations, all except Cuba, met to discuss the future of free
trade. By the time they adjourned, the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)
was born."2 The FTAA would be a free trade zone encompassing all of the Western
Hemisphere from Canada to Argentina-the largest free trade zone ever envisioned.
A Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action was created to express the ideas
discussed and negotiated at the Summit." 3 The first paragraph of the Declaration of
Principles provides the following:
Free trade and increased economic integration are key factors for raising standards
of living, improving the working conditions of people in the Americas and better
The less developed members of LAFTA feared that the "Big Three" nations of Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico would hold an unfair advantage with the reduction of the trade barriers.
See O'Hop, supra note 104, at 131.
107. The Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) replaced LAFTA. See Treaty of Montev-
ideo Establishing the Latin American Integration Association, Aug. 12, 1980, 20 I.L.M. 672.
Other Latin American trade associations include the Caribbean Community, Andean Pact,
and MERCOSUR. See, e.g., O'Hop, supra note 104.
108. LAIA provides for agreements of both regional and partial scope. This allows LAIA members
to negotiate trade preferences with other nations without having to extend the benefits of
the agreements to all the members of the organization. See O'Hop, supra note 104, at 131.
109. Although agreed to in principle by the thirty-four Western Hemisphere nations' leaders in
1994, the idea of free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere was first strongly pursued
by the Bush Administration's Enterprise for the America's Initiative in 1990, which called for
the creation of a free trade zone from "the port of Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego." Id. at 127
(citing Remarks Announcing the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, 1 PUB. PAPERS 873, 875
(June 27, 1990)); see also Anderson, supra note 103, at 640-41.
110. See Nankivell, supra note 75.
111. See generally Ruperto Patino Maniffer, Symposium: NAFTA at Age One: A Blueprint for Hemi-
spheric Integration?: The Future of Free Trade in the Americas, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 639 (1995);
Brenda A. Jacobs, Facing the Next Challenge: FTAA, BOBBIN, Nov. 1998, at 28; Anderson,
supra note 103.
112. It was initially proposed that the FTAA be called "AFTA" by dropping the "North" from the
North American Free Trade Agreement. This was rejected when Brazil pointed out that in
Portuguese "afta" was slang for a certain variety of open mouth sores. David E. Sanger, An
Epidemic Averted: Foot-in-Mouth Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at 22.
113. See Manffer, supra note 111.
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protecting the environment. We, therefore, resolve to begin immediately to construct
the "Free Trade Area of the Americas" ("FTAA"), in which barriers to trade and
investment will be progressively eliminated. We further resolve to conclude the
negotiation of the "Free Trade Area of the Americas" no later than 2005, and agree
that concrete progress toward the attainment of this objective will be made by
the end of this century. We recognize the progress that already has been realized
through the unilateral undertakings of each of our nations and the subregional trade
arrangements in our Hemisphere. We will build on existing subregional and bilateral
arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric economic integration
and to bring the agreements together.1 '4
The declaration also included a Plan of Action, which contained concrete agree-
ments on steps to be taken to advance the process of trade liberalization and economic
integration in America. In a section entitled "To Promote Prosperity Through Economic
Integration and Free Trade"' 5 the leaders of the thirty-four nations stated:
We will strive to maximize the market openness through high levels of discipline
as we build upon existing agreements in the Hemisphere. We also will strive for
balanced and comprehensive agreements, including among others: tariffs and non-
tariff barriers affecting trade in goods and services; agriculture; subsidies; invest-
ment; intellectual property rights; government procurement; technical barriers to
trade; safeguards; rules of origin; antidumping and countervailing duties; sanitary
and phytosanitary standards and procedures; dispute resolution; and competition
policy.'16
The FTAA will be a program of collective and individual actions by the thirty-four
countries, which seeks improvements in virtually every aspect of economic and social
life." 7 Free trade is at the core of the FTAA, but that is only a fraction for what it
-*anA 118
The FTAA will create "the richest free trade zone in the history of the world"
with a population of 800 million and fifteen trillion dollars worth of gross domestic
product." 9 In so doing, the plan is to remove the tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade
and promote economic integration. This will in turn promote prosperity, reduce poverty,
and guarantee sustainable development for the entire Western Hemisphere. 2 °
114. Summit of the Americas, Declaration of Principles, Dec. 9-11, 1994, reprinted in Manffer,
supra note 111, at 640.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 640-41.
117. See Robert Johnstone, Free Trade in the Americas and a Great Deal More, BEHIND THE HEAD-
LINES, Dec. 1998, at 22.
118. Much like the FTA and NAFTA before it, as well as other regional agreements, the FTAA
will include much more than trade rules and tariff reductions. Education, strengthening
democracy, and economic integration of human rights and justice are issues to be included
in the agreement. Id.
119. Purvis, supra note 54.
120. See Johnstone, supra note 117.
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Five regional free trade arrangements are currently in existence in the Western
Hemisphere: the Andean Pact,' 2 1 the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM),' 122 the
Central American Common Market (CACM), 123 the Southern Cone Common Market
(MERCOSUR), 124 and NAFTA. 2s The ultimate goal of the FTAA is to build upon the
achievements of these arrangements and the many other bilateral agreements that exist
throughout the hemisphere. 126 Like NAFTA, these agreements were premised on the idea
of free trade and economic integration between the member countries, which, in turn,
would eventually lead to free trade throughout the hemisphere'
27
Canada is in an excellent position to make the FTAA a reality. In the negotiations
for the FTAA, Canada has taken a lead position being named chairman for the first
eighteen months of negotiations. 28 This position allows Canada to set the pace of and
the directions in which the negotiations will proceed. Therefore, Canada will likely be
able to use the ideas it has for free trade in shaping the eventual free trade agreement.'
29
Despite the optimism of the nations' leaders, the FTAA is an extremely ambitious
project that may take well beyond its deadline of 2005 to come to fruition, if at all.
The task will be a formidable one for several reasons. First, convincing the leaders of
thirty-four countries to agree to specifics on trade is a daunting task. The structure of
the meetings and the nature of the planning of a FTAA remain vague."' Currently, small
121. Agreement originally between Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru created in 1969, also
known as the Agreement of Cartagena. See Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration,
May 26, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 910. Venezuela joined in 1973. See Andean Commission-Venezuela:
Final Act of the Negotiations on the Entry of Venezuela into the Cartagena Agreement, Feb.
13, 1973, 12 I.L.M. 344.
122. The Agreement was originally created in 1973, signed by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and
Trinidad and Tobago. See Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, July 4, 1973, 12
I.L.M. 1033. Antigua, Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis,
St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines joined in 1974. See GUISEPPE SCHIAVONE,
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONs: A DICTIONARY AND DIRECTORY 41-42 (1983). The Bahamas
joined in 1983. Id.
123. Created in 1960 by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Costa Rica joined
in 1962. See General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration, Dec. 13, 1960, 455
U.N.T.S. 3.
124. Established in 1991 through the Treaty of Asuncion, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay,
and Uruguay. See Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic,
the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay, and the Eastern Republic of
Uruguay, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1044. The name MERCOSUR comes from the Spanish
version of Common Market of the South, Mercado Comun del Sur. See generally Ana Maria
de Aguinis, The Future of Free Trade in the Americas: Can MERCOSUR Accede to NAFTA? A
Legal Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 597 (1995).
125. See Stephen Lande & Nellis Crigler, Consensus in the Americas: Free Trade by 2005, Bus. MEX.,
Special Edition 1995, at 70.
126. Id.
127. See generally O'Hop, supra note 104.
128. See Canada Ready, supra note 99.
129. Id.
130. See Peter H. Smith, Whither Hemispheric Integration?, 34 Bus. ECON. 38, July 1, 1999.
198 Law and Business Review of the Americas
committees discuss and map out requirements for free trade within different economic
sectors. 3 ' How final resolutions will be passed remains to be seen. 32
Second, a great imbalance exists among the countries in terms of size, wealth, and
level of development.'33 The countries range from advanced industrial to low-income.
1 34
Bridging the gap between the difference in needs, priorities, and capabilities will be an
enormous task.'35 For the amount of economic integration required to make the FTAA
a reality, the countries remain far apart economically.
36
Third, the hemisphere's most powerful and most important nation lacks the ability
to negotiate freely with the other nations. The U.S. Congress has not given the Pres-
ident "fast-track" authority to negotiate and agree to a FTAA without the consent of
Congress.' 37 Without such authority, the United States will not be able to join the FTAA
until Congress agrees to it, slowing down the process even further. The United States, the
largest economic power in the hemisphere, is seen as the cornerstone of the agreement.
Without the presence of the United States in the FTAA, the agreement is unlikely to
come about. 3'
These problems were apparent at the most recent round of FTAA negotiations in
Toronto last November. At that meeting, representatives of the FTAA nations did sign
an agreement to ease customs restrictions and agreed to oppose agricultural subsidies.'
39
However, attempts at forward progress in negotiating the overall free trade zone failed. 4 °
The nations will now spend the next eighteen months working on a draft to present
at the next meeting in Argentina. 4 ' The meetings were hampered by the absence of
131. There are nine negotiating groups on separate issues: market access, agriculture, invest-
ment services, government procurement, intellectual property rights, subsidies, antidumping
and countervailing duties, competition policy, and dispute settlement. Id. Three consultative
groups exist as well: smaller economies, electronic commerce, and civil society. Id.
132. No rules on decision-making are currently in place. Id.
133. The economic output of the United States utterly dwarfs that of Latin America. The United
States' GNP is approximately ten times that of Brazil, twenty-two times that of Mexico,
twenty-five times that of Argentina, 100 times that of Venezuela and four times that of the




136. The level of economic disparity also poses the problem that the United States' domination
and influence over the FTAA negotiations will force Latin America to follow the United
States' lead. Id.
137. Id.
138. At the follow-up Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile in 1998, President Clinton
assured the leaders of the thirty-three other nations that the United States remained commit-
ted to the FTAA. Id. However, U.S. delegates, without the fast-track authority, were unable
to act with force at the Summit, drawing sharp criticism from Latin American leaders. Id.
139. See Ian Jack, Americas Meeting Agrees to Oppose Agricultural Export Subsidies at WTO: FTAA
Progress Limited, NATIONAL POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at C5.
140. Id.
141. Id. Argentina was the main opponent to the agreement on the table. Id. One Canadian official
was quoted as saying Argentina wanted to block the agreement so it could produce a similar
draft at the meetings in their country and announce progress. Id.
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trade officials from the United States and Mexico. 14 2 The absence of these two officials,
especially that of the United States, slowed negotiations considerably. In addition, the
separation between the small and large economy countries continue to grow. The small
countries prefer a slower process to developing the FTAA so their economies will not
be overwhelmed, but the larger countries including Canada wish to proceed quicker.'43
Many of the South American countries want to increase their own trading partners
individually before entering into a large-scale agreement like the FTAA.' 44 They feel this
will help them ease into the free trade market, making the significant changes that the
FTAA will likely bring be less disruptive to their economies. 141
Another problem that arose at the most recent meetings was the protests by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) over their lack of involvement in the FTAA creation
process. The FTAA nation representatives did agree to allow members of the NGOs to
participate in the trade talks, but only to a limited extent. 146 NGOs were given only a
ninety-minute session to present their wish lists, while business leaders from the repre-
sentative countries were given the opportunity to present their ideas at great length.'47
One of the groups creating a disturbance at the meetings was the Hemispheric Social
Alliance, a group that represents more than fifty labor, human rights, and community
organizations. 4 ' The group presented demands of civil and social concern to the FTAA
negotiators.'49 The concerns included workers' rights and potential human rights viola-
tions that may arise from the free trade zone.5 0 More than 200 activists gathered at the
FTAA negotiations to protest the potential violations and ask that the negotiators listen
to the common people, who will be affected by the FTAA the most.'
Clearly, a strong opposition exists to the FTAA process. The fallout from the protests
at both the FTAA meeting and the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle may
force leaders to rethink the process and develop a new way to bring a hemispheric free
trade agreement into being. 152
142. See Ian Jack, Opposing Agendas Trip up Americas Trade Talks: Small v. Large Economies: Top
Officials from U.S., Mexico Absent from Meeting, NATIONAL POST, Nov. 4, 1999, at C3. Her-
manio Blanco, the Mexican trade minister, was injured in a ski accident, while U.S. trade
representative Charlene Barshefsky remained in Washington, D.C., to work on trade negoti-




146. See Jack, supra note 139.
147. See Jack, supra note 142.
148. See FTAA Negotiations Must Not Proceed Unless Process Is Democratized Say Labour, Human
Rights and Civil Society Representatives, CANADA NEwsWIRE, Nov. 3, 1999.
149. Id.
150. Id. Among the demands were basic labor standards like child labor laws and the right to
freedom of association. Id.
151. See Activists Gather in Toronto for Parallel Trade Forum as FTAA Negotiations Begin, CANADA
NEwSWIRE, Nov. 2, 1999.
152. See Linda Diebel, Seattle Fallout Drifts South, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 26, 1999. The protests
at the WTO meetings in Seattle and the ensuing action taken by the Washington National
Guard may have great impact on trade with Latin America. Video of police dragging away
protestors and using teargas were prominent throughout the Hemisphere. Id.
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B. LATIN AMERICAN ACCESSION TO NAFTA
The United States favors an approach where the Latin American countries would
be admitted to NAFTA. Sometimes termed a "building block" approach, Latin Ameri-
can countries would join NAFTA either individually or through their subregional trade
groups." 3 The "building block" approach, first developed by the Clinton administration,
entails four steps.5 4 The first building block is already in place, with the United States
already establishing basic agreements with several countries.155 Second, the countries
participating would develop harmonization plans for specific sectors of their economies,
such as creating similar product standards and investment regulations.5 6 The intent is to
bring the candidate countries' economies more closely in alignment with the economies
of the NAFTA members in order to ease the transition of the candidate countries
into NAFTA. Third, Latin American nations would become candidates for accession to
NAFTA upon meeting certain economic and non-economic criteria set by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico.'57 Finally, each country that meets the criteria would then
be admitted to NAFTA. 5 8
On the surface, this approach seems like a logical and easy approach to free trade
expansion. NAFTA is already in place and embodies much of what a proposed FTAA
would include.5 9 In addition to trade, NAFTA covers investment, competition, and
telecommunications, to name a few. 60 And the fact that the body of the agreement
already exists would eliminate the time and expense involved in drafting an entirely new
trade agreement. Accession to NAFTA was a popular enough idea at the Summit of the
Americas in 1994, that the three NAFTA countries announced their intention to begin
accession talks with Chile.' 6' However, no additional country has yet to be admitted to
NAFTA.
Several reasons exist for this result. First, NAFTA lacks established criteria for admis-
sion of new members. 62 The language of the trade agreement is vague. NAFTA simply
i53. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note i03, at 643; O'Hop, supra note 104. individual accession to
NAFTA by Latin American nations is often termed "piecemeal accession." See Frank J. Garcia,
NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539,
550 (1995). "Bloc accession" is the term for accession to NAFTA by regional trade groups.
Id. at 551.
154. See O'Hop, supra note 104, at 152. The "building block" approach was actually a combination
of several key elements of alternative approaches to NAFTA accession. Id.
155. See Anderson, supra note 103, at 643; O'Hop, supra note 104, at 152. The United States has
reached bilateral accords with a handful of Latin American nations as well as with multilateral
organizations such as MERCOSUR. Id.
156. See Anderson, supra note 103; O'Hop, supra note 104, at 152.
157. See Anderson, supra note 103, at 643.
158. Id.
159. See Smith, supra note 130 (stating that NAFTA was envisioned as the stepping stone toward
a hemispheric free trade agreement).
160. Id.
161. See NAFTA 'Amigos" Invite Chile to Begin Accession Talks, 11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Dec.
14, 1994, at 1914.
162. See Smith, supra note 130; see also Special Report: 1995 Trade Outlook, 12 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA), Jan. 18, 1995, at 129, 131-32.
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states that new countries may join NAFTA subject to terms and conditions set by the
member countries.'63 Before any new members can be admitted, the current NAFTA
countries must develop appropriate procedures for accession. 64 In addition, they must
also identify the economic and non-economic conditions that Latin American countries
must meet prior to entering into accession talks.1 6 All decisions on the establishment of
criteria and admission of new members must be unanimous; effectively giving each of
the three NAFTA members veto power over matters and countries they do not favor.
166
Second, it is unclear whether NAFTA is a strong enough agreement to allow acces-
sion.167 Despite the fact that NAFTA was designed with the intention of being a building
block to increased free trade in the hemisphere, the agreement itself still centers on the
economies of the three member countries. 16' The economy and needs of any potential
new member would certainly need to be addressed prior to accession. 69 Given that most
of the Latin American countries have significantly weaker economies than the NAFTA
members, greater protection might be necessary. 70 This may require significant changes
to the text of NAFTA that might alter the original agreement.
Conversely, the treaty is highly specialized, full of special provisions that make it a
difficult instrument for non-member countries to follow.'7' Some Latin American coun-
tries have indicated a desire for simple and straightforward bilateral free trade agreements
with the United States, providing their basic needs, foreign investment in their country,
and guaranteed access to consumers in the United States.'72 This poses a greater problem
for Canada.
In the Western Hemisphere, the United States is the most powerful nation, particu-
larly from an economic standpoint. This gives the United States an edge in negotiating
for NAFTA accession. If the Latin American countries' main focus is to avail themselves
of the consumers in the United States, then Canada and Mexico will only be marginal
players in the accession process.
C. NORTH-SOUTH COUPLING
Latin American nations favor a plan based upon a continuation of the existing Latin
American trade groups. The idea is to form powerful subregional trade blocs and use
163. See Smith, supra note 130.
164. See Garcia, supra note 153, at 544.
165. Richard G. Lipsey, Getting There: The Path to a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area and Its
Structure, in THE PREMISE AND THE PROMISE: FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 104-05 (Sylvia
Saborio et al. eds. 1992).
166. See Smith, supra note 130.
167. See FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE NAFTA AND
WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION SYSTEM 184-85
(1995).
168. See Smith, supra note 130.
169. Id.; see also ABBOTT, supra note 167; O'Hop, supra note 104.
170. See generally Smith, supra note 130.
171. Id.
172. Id. Chile, Costa Rica, and Argentina have indicated their desire for bilateral free trade agree-
ments with the United States. Id.
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them as "building blocks" for an inter-American accord.' 73 In essence, the two dominant
trade groups in the Western Hemisphere, NAFTA in the North and MERCOSUR in
the South, would establish an accord creating free trade between the members of both
groups. 7 In contrast to the idea backed by the United States, this idea of coupling avoids
the messy process of accession to NAFTA by Latin American countries. Rather, the Latin
American countries would create a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA),' 75 based
upon the principles of MERCOSUR, to negotiate an agreement with NAFTA.
7 6
MERCOSUR's current members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Chile
and Bolivia are associate members.'77 Like NAFTA, MERCOSUR was designed with
more than trade in mind. A clear political goal exists: the consolidation of democracy
and the maintenance of peace throughout South America. 7 The member nations saw
the agreement as an opportunity to bring the South American nations together as a
unit economically and politically to compete against North America and the rest of the
world.'79 SAFTA would exist as an extension of MERCOSUR, with the intent to include
all the South American countries in one large trade group. The idea is to then create a
free trade agreement between SAFTA and NAFTA, but the groups would remain separate,
retaining their unique regional characteristics.' 80
A major problem with the North-South coupling plan is that similar to NAFTA, with
a dominant member in the United States, MERCOSUR and SAFTA have a dominant
member in Brazil. Other South American nations fear Brazil will dictate the policies
by which the agreements would operate.' Without any formal link to North America
or NAFTA, SAFTA would reflect regional domination by Brazil. 2 It is also likely that
within the course of negotiations with North America, Brazil would become the principal
negotiator for SAFTA, much like the United States' role with NAFTA.8 3 Brazil would
then become the hub of South America.' Meanwhile, Canada again is left to accept the
plans of other countries.
Another issue is that the coupling plan fails to account for Central American nations
and the nations of the Caribbean. 5 In order to achieve a complete free trade area
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. In Spanish, Area de Libre Comercio Sudamericana (ALCSA). See generally Smith, supra note
130. The goal of SAFTA is to create a free trade zone for all trade within the continent. Id.
176. SAFTXs intentions are the following: capitalize on the experience of MERCOSUR, reach out
to neighboring countries (and groups), and accumulate negotiating power for dealing with




180. One idea is to create a "docking" arrangement that would link the two trade groups together
without requiring either one to adhere to all the terms of the other group. See generally
Smith, supra note 130.
181. Brazil sees MERCOSUR and SAFTA as part of a national strategy to confirm Brazil's historic




185. See generally id.
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throughout the Western Hemisphere, these countries must be accounted for. But it is
unclear how these countries will get involved, if at all, in the coupling plan.1
8 6
D. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Another option for Canada is not discussed much, but has shown to be advantageous
in the past. Rather than attempting a grand scheme such as the FTAA, involving all
the nations of the hemisphere in one agreement, Canada could pursue smaller bilateral
and multilateral trade agreements like the one already in place with Chile. The free
trade agreement with Chile and the Team Canada mission to Latin America has shown
Canada that Latin America is receptive to trade." 7 Given that the lack of United States
"fast-track" authority is slowing the FTAA negotiation process, Canada has an excellent
opportunity to step out on its own.
8
The successes of the free trade agreement with Chile and the Team Canada mission
are not the only indicators of Canada's potential for bilateral and multilateral trade
expansion. The members of MERCOSUR have indicated an interest in pursuing a trade
agreement directly with Canada.8 9
The advantage for Canada in pursuing bilateral trade agreements is that it cuts the
United States out of the loop, helping to lessen Canada's dependence upon the United
States for trade. 90 The disadvantage is that in pursuing many trade agreements instead of
one, the time spent and costs in negotiating these many agreements may be substantially
greater.
V. What Is Canada's Best Option?
One thing is clear from the developments over the past few years: the potential for
free trade throughout the Western Hemisphere exists. Canada has a great opportunity
to be right in the middle of it. The grand idea of a FTAA remains a reality only in the
distant future. How then, can Canada best expand its trade possibilities?
Canada's main philosophy all along has been to decrease reliance upon the United
States as a trade partner.'9' The best option may seem to be to include all the members
of the Western Hemisphere in one large free trade pact. In an instant, Canada would
be blessed with over thirty new trade partners. The opportunities for investment and
trade would be boundless. The obstacles, however, standing in the way of an FTAA are
numerous and cast doubt as to whether such an agreement can be put together in the
near future, if ever. Little will happen in the United States until after the 2000 presidential
186. See generally Smith, supra note 130.
187. See, e.g., Purvis, supra note 54; Planning Ahead, supra note 75; Nankivell, supra note 75.
188. See Jacobs, supra note 111. The United States faces a great disadvantage due to its lack of
fast-track authority, resulting in exclusion from the trade agreements reached between and
among Latin American countries and Canada. Id.
189. See Nankivell, supra note 75. MERCOSUR and Canadian officials have engaged in talks to
enhance trade relations. Id.
190. See generally Morici, supra note 1.
191. Id.
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elections.' 92 FTAA negotiations were hurt further by the negative fallout from the protests
in Seattle at the World Trade Organization meetings in December 1999.193
Despite problems with the FTAA, Latin America remains the focus of Canada's trade
expansion, regardless of how it is accomplished. Canada has taken every opportunity to
improve relations in the region.'94 The Latin American nations in return believe Canada
understands their needs in regard to trade.' 95 However, Latin America presents problems
for any trade partner.
Despite economic growth and price stability in the region, a recent report by the
International Labour Organization said workers in Latin America and the Caribbean
encountered increased unemployment and an erosion of social benefits..'96 Legal protec-
tion in the form of laws and unions simply does not exist.'97 These problems in turn
have caused great turmoil. Protests and even civil war are commonplace, and dictators
reign supreme. 9 For example, in Colombia, civil war has raged for over forty years
between the government and guerrilla groups, resulting in over 30,000 political mur-
ders between 1986 and 1994.'9' Despite these problems, Latin America remains a "key
battleground for world trade and the deals of the future.'2 O
Economically, Canada enters the new millennium in excellent shape. Gross domes-
tic product grew roughly 4 percent in 1999 and continued growth is expected.20 1 The
unemployment rate is at its lowest point in twenty-five years.20 2 In order to continue this
economic prosperity, the Canadian government needs to continue pro-competitive trade
and economic policies, such as pushing for greater trade liberalization globally.20 3 There
is a fear that by continuing toward globalization, deeply rooted Canadian values will be
left behind. But Canadian values are recognized and appreciated the world over.204 Trade
192. See Michael Hart, The FTAA? Who Cares?, TIME, June 28, 1999, at 36. President Clinton was
denied fast-track negotiating authority by Congress; however, the next U.S. President should
gain such power by 2001 or 2002. Id.
193. See Diebel, supra note 152.
194. For example, Canada recently pledged two million dollars in aid for Haiti's elections in March
and April of 2000 through CARICOM. See Canada Pledges $2 Million to Aid Elections Set for
Haiti, THE LONDON FREE PRESS, Jan. 9, 2000, at A10.
195. CARICOM leaders are "convinced that Canada understands that small states would require
special and preferential treatment in international trade." Id. (quoting St. Kitts and Nevis
Prime Minister Denzil Douglas).
196. See Diebel, supra note 152. Unemployment in the region stood at 9.5 percent compared with









204. See Pierre S. Pettigrew, Canada's Most Precious Export Commodities Are Its Values, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 4, 1999. "Canadians do not accept the idea that the rich can live alongside the
poor while remaining indifferent to their plight. They have a sense of the common good, of
belonging to a global community." Id.
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cannot be reduced to just an exchange of tangible products, rather "[t] rade is also a series
of cultural, technical, scientific, moral and philosophical exchanges. '20 5 "Everyone looks
to Canada for inspiration in establishing standards that are realistic, truly implementable
and conducive to advancing civilized values'
20 6
In order to continue moving forward with their economy, Canada must expand
their trade practices and must do so with regard to the values on which the country was
built. Canada is in an enviable position because it can provide a valuable trading partner
to developing countries without the overbearing attitude and control required by the
United States. Canada's best option may be to separate itself from the United States and
pursue trade agreements with individual countries and trading blocks on its own until
the FTAA can become a reality.
VI. Conclusion
The latter half of the twentieth century has witnessed remarkable change in the
Canadian economy, but the task has only just begun. Regardless of the method used,
expansion of trade into Latin America, and potentially the rest of the world, is the
next logical step in Canada's economic redevelopment. Finding new trade partners will
decrease Canada's reliance on the United States for trade and increase Canada's trade
value and power throughout the world. The FTAA, at first glance, seems to be the most
logical and promising trade expansion idea for Canada. By opening the borders to the
rest of the countries in the Western Hemisphere, Canada can continue to diversify its
trade practices and develop into a dominant economic power. The grand scale of the
FTAA, however, makes it more of a wish than a reality.
Convincing the leaders of thirty-four nations to agree on a trade pact is a daunting
task. In addition, the cultural boundaries and economic disparity that exist between
the nations are obstacles that will not be easily overcome. But this does not mean a
hemisphere-wide free trade agreement cannot come into being. A slower, building block
approach may serve as a better method. Several methods have been suggested. With
NAFTA already in place, accession by Latin American nations would seem logical, but
no plan for accession to NAFTA is in place and NAFTAs rule may not suit the needs of
the Latin American countries. For the same reasons, a coupling plan between NAFTA
and MERCOSUR is not likely to work. In addition to their impracticalities, both of these
ideas subject Canada to playing second fiddle to the United States in the negotiation
process. The best choice for Canada is to move ahead with a plan to negotiate its own
free trade agreements with Latin America.
Canada has actively pursued expanded trade with its Latin American counterparts,
resulting in success. Given that the United States has not been a party to these agree-
ments and the goal of Canada's trade expansion is to reduce reliance on the United States
as a trade partner, Canada's best option is to move forward with further self-negotiated
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Building upon the successes of NAFTA and the
free trade agreement with Chile, Canada can continue to pursue other trade agreements
throughout the hemisphere. Likely new partners include MERCOSUR and CARICOM,
205. Id.
206. Id.
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and the member nations individually. The ideal situation would be for Canada to develop
a network of agreements throughout Latin America. For example, Canada could poten-
tially reach accords with MERCOSUR, CARICOM, and a few Central and South Amer-
ican nations individually. Canada would then have a trade agreement with nearly all of
Latin America. In so doing, Canada will establish wider trade relations, further lessening
dependence on the United States, and establishing itself as an economic power. And as
Canada builds an extensive network throughout the Americas, it can only help to foster
cooperation and trust between North and South America, and facilitate the eventual
creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
